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July 31, 2007

Iran:

Strategic Options for U.S. Policy and the Region



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I was asked to talk about Iran in the strategic context. I have to say there are undoubtedly many more people here who are more expert on Iran than I am. It's a country that I've looked at across the border but the only country in the greater Middle East that I've actually never been to. But it's impossible to spend your time dealing with the part of the world that I've devoted much of my career to Iraq—Pakistan, in particular—and not be engaged on the issue of Iran.

Let me begin my discussion today on Iran with Iraq. I think this really is the starting point. We as a country now have to face up to some very stark realities. First in Iraq, the Iraq war is lost. It is lost in the sense that there is no way we that can accomplish the mission that President Bush has laid out, mainly a democratic, stable, and unified Iraq. I was particularly struck on July 15th when he spoke on this interim report on Iraq. He said he would not be committing U.S. troops and resources if he didn't think we could succeed. The fact of the matter is we have no strategy to succeed. We have no possibility of achieving that goal.

Now even if you look at the rationale for the war, it is not the benefits of victory with democracy in the Middle East, even with democratic Iraq. The war is justified by the consequences of failure. The President is very selective in the consequence of failure that he presents to us. In his May 5th radio address, he painted a scenario of what defeat in Iraq would mean. That is to say, terrorists and Al-Qaeda controlling the country with vast oil resources not content to work their will there, but spreading terror, beheading the Middle East, and then coming for us. And indeed this fits in with

the image that many Americans have of defeat in Iraq; that is to say, what happened in Vietnam in 1975, that when we lose we will be evacuating our diplomats from the world's largest embassy as Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda close in.

That isn't how it's going to happen. That's not what defeat in Iraq looks like. In fact, defeat in Iraq looks pretty much like Iraq today. Namely, a country that is divided, that has broken up, independent Kurdistan in the north, a civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites, and with no prospect of that civil war is going to end. And, interestingly although understandably the President then would like us to believe that Al-Qaeda is the alternative. But the fact of the matter is George Bush lost the Iraq war and Iran won the Iraq war. And the issue that we have to deal with is that Iran has emerged victorious. The U.S. invasion of Iraq paved the way for Iraq's Shi'ite religious parties to assume power in Bagdad which they did, democratically after the 2005 parliamentary elections. The largest of these political parties then called the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq was founded in Tehran in 1982. [Editor's note: In May 2007, SCIRI announced that it would change its name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claiming that the name "Revolution" was direct reference to overthrowing the previous Ba'athist government.] Its military wing is still the most important militia in Iraq, now called the Badr Organization; created by Iran, funded by Iran, officered by Iran, and has close connections with Iraq today. It is the dominate force in the new Iraqi army.

Iran has supported all the Iraqi Shi'ite parties that are part of Iraq's ruling coalition. And while these parties have made some effort to appease the United States, for example adopting what is merely a moderately Islamic constitution for Iraq, they have in fact implemented on the ground in southern Iraq a Shi'ite Islamic state that in its application of Islamic law is substantially more severe than what exists in Iran. Iranian advisors and agents have flooded southern Iraq and Bagdad, while Iraq's ruling

Shi'ite parties routinely seek Iranian approval for major policy decisions—at least approval for those policy decisions that they actually intend to carry out. (They may make other announcements that they don't intend to carry out, but if they're going to do something, they get Iran's approval.)

Agreements reached in 2005, aligning Iraq's strategic oil section with Iran's, is significant. Between the two, these countries control a very substantial part of the world's oil reserves and production and agreements that provide for Iranian training of Iraqi-Shi'ite Armed Forces. Joint Iranian and Iraq Shi'ite Hezbollah have moved to settle scores from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, assassinating so many Iraqi pilots from that era that Iraq's current Kurdish President Jalal Talabani offered the pilots sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan.

One of the many unintended consequences of the unplanned and ill-prepared U.S. takeover of Iraq which in fact has handed Iran its greatest strategic triumph since the 1639 Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin [NOTE: Also called the Treaty of Zuhab], demarcating the present border between Iraq and Iran—a line that not only divided the Ottoman Empire from the Persian Empire, and the Arab world from the Persian Empire, but the Shi'ite-ruled world from the Sunni-ruled World. That line of demarcation has now vanished.

President Bush's foreign policy has benefitted Iran in other ways as well. In Afghanistan, the U.S. swept away a Taliban regime that espouses hostility to Shi'ism, because the Taliban (as with Al-Qaeda) are part of a Sunni movement that considers Shi'ite apostates who deserve to be killed. The Taliban regime murdered four Iranian diplomats in the northern city of Mazār-e Sharīf. Beyond that, problems in Iraq have enabled Syria's regime, once seemed bordering on collapse—especially after it was caught red-handed in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Syria has consolidated its position domestically and has rehabilitated itself internationally. As one result of

the American misadventure in Iraq, Iran has dramatically increased its influence in Lebanon and Palestine through the successes of Hezbollah and Hamas (both supported by Iran), both capitalizing on the absence of any serious U.S. engagement in a peace process.

And most importantly, the Bush administration seems to have given Iran a free pass to move forward with its nuclear program. While proclaiming loudly that he will never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, President Bush has taken no steps militarily or diplomatically that might hinder or stop Tehran's nuclear program and the Iranians have noticed.

In Iraq, Iran has played its hand cleverly. It allowed the United States to spend vast sums of money and deploy significant number of troops to accomplish Iran's objectives of supporting a government that is Iran's closest ally in the world. And in Afghanistan, Iran is perfectly content for NATO to fight its enemy the Taliban. For strategic reasons, Iran does not want to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq or Afghanistan. As long as American forces are tied down in Iraq, the U.S. has fewer military or diplomatic options for dealing with Iran's nuclear program. The Iranian regime also benefits from anti-American sentiment generated by the U.S. presence both in the region and inside Iraq. Hostility towards Bush and the U.S. is an effective way for the Iranian ruling clergy to undercut pro-Western, pro-democracy sentiment inside their own country.

President Bush's Iran policy has failed for essentially the same reason it failed in Iraq. He has pursued a course of action based on fantasies about Iran and wishful thinking about what the U.S. could accomplish, which is exactly the same problem as in Iraq and his failure to prioritize and failure to match resources with objectives. In short, as with Iran, we entered Iraq without a strategy.

I'd like to discuss what the strategy for Iran might be. A proper Iran strategy should begin by asking "What is it the United States wishes to accomplish?" It's very hard to get some place if you don't know where you want to go. Our objectives might be and should be to prioritize in terms of what is important to us, and achievable. This necessarily must take into account both the domestic and regional circumstances affecting Iran's decision-makers as well as the resources the United States is prepared to expend and the risks that we are prepared to take. Once we have defined and prioritized—that's really the key—our own objectives, then we might want to consider what motivates Iran to do what Senator Pell always told me to do: Put yourself in the other man's shoes. In short, what are Iran's objectives? Our strategy then needs to take account both of our objectives and Iran's goals, again keeping in mind both the risk to us and the costs.

The Bush administration has had five main objectives with Iran:

1. Regime change from the current bureaucracy to a democratic system that might be pro-Western;
2. An end to Iran's nuclear program, including a halt to its uranium enrichment activities;
3. That Iran not undermine the United States in Iraq;
4. That Iran not support radical Islamic groups or undermine Arab countries, particularly the Persian Gulf monarchies that sit atop a lot of oil;
5. And that Iran be a reliable supplier of oil to global markets.

In analyzing this list, it is immediately apparent how ineffective the administration has been in terms of accomplishing any of these goals. In terms of democracy in the last six years, Iran rulers have become much more hard line and much more entrenched. Iran has resumed a previously suspended uranium enrichment program. The administration repeatedly charges Iran is working against U.S. interests in Iraq, including supplying sophisticated ammunition that is killing U.S. troops. Iran has

stepped up its support for Islamic radicals including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Overall, it's a pretty dismal record of failure.

The root of the problem is that we have not matched resources to our objectives. We had inflatable rhetoric supported by feeble and ineffectual status. And to make matters worse, this is completely apparent to Iran's leaders.

Now let's discuss some of our options. Military action is the one way, the only way that could accomplish both regime change and an end to Iran's nuclear programs. If we were prepared to commit the U.S. military, manpower, and economic resources—including what is absolutely essential, a resumed military draft—I am confident that we could oust the regime in Tehran and take over the country and dismantle Iran's nuclear facilities. But the costs of such course of such course of action would, of course, be horrific. Unlike Iraq, where U.S. removal of Saddam Hussein was welcomed by 80 percent of Iraq's population that is the part of the population that is Kurds and Shi'ite, almost all of the Iranians—except possibly the Iranian Kurds—would vehemently oppose a U.S. invasion, even those who don't like the regime. Casualties would be great and a guerrilla-style resistance a certainty.

A U.S. invasion of Iran would be condemned by almost every country worldwide. And we may find ourselves at the receiving end of international sanctions, including some imposed by some of our current allies. A full-scale invasion of Iran under current circumstances would never be supported by the American people. It would ensure that whatever administration embarked on such an action and whatever Congress approved it would be out of office at the next elections with the understanding that we would withdraw from Iran with catastrophic consequences. In short, there is no realistic

military option that can accomplish both regime change and an end to Iran's nuclear program. And there is certainly no other strategy, non-military strategy, that can accomplish that. I would argue that, short of a full-scale invasion there's no U.S. strategy that can accomplish regime change. But stopping Iran's nuclear program could be accomplished in one of two ways.

First the United States, together with allies might negotiate a deal with Iran to roll back, freeze or, more plausibly, cap Iran's nuclear program. In other words, it's going to be much harder to get Iran to reverse what's done, but more plausible to stop at the current level or some further stage but well short of actually developing nuclear weapons. That's one alternative, a negotiated deal.

Second, the U.S., Iraq acting alone or giving a green light to the Israelis, might use air power to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. Both a negotiated deal and a military strike at Iran's nuclear facilities are completely incompatible with the objective of regime change. Iran's government is not likely to give up its nuclear options as long as it believes the United States is plotting its overthrow. Air strikes will also almost certainly rally support for the Iran regime as well as entailing enormous risks to the United States in terms of retaliation. However, the Bush administration has been unwilling to choose between regime change and stopping Iran's nuclear program. The President and his neo-conservative associates are ideologically committed to regime change at time when Iran had a moderate reformist president [Mohammed Khatami], when it was helping the United States against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and when in fact it was even being cooperative for some of the advanced preparations for the war in Iraq.

President Bush went out of his way to brand Iran's government as evil. Then he compounded the insult by stating without any plausible basis that it was in an alliance with Saddam Hussein's Iraq—

part of an “Axis of Evil”—like the Berlin-Rome axis between Hitler and Mussolini. Never mind that Iran and Saddam Hussein had fought an eight-year war and there were no more bitter enemies any place in the world; Bush charged that they were allies. Vice President Cheney ruled out talking with evil and the President has used his State of the Union address and his second Inaugural address to issue a veiled call to the Iranian people to overthrow their rulers.

While I am willing to abandon regime change, the Bush administration’s efforts to accomplish it have been feeble—as is typical for the president, he’s managed to top rhetoric with little action. The administration is spending 75 million dollars on programs to support democracy in Iran and is making radio broadcasts into a country on the voice of America and a surrogate radio station. If only regime change could be accomplished so easily. The administration has often toyed with supporting a range of Iranian opposition groups. It is unclear whether any of these flirtations have been consummated, but the administration’s neo-conservative allies have pushed for military and financial support to a diverse set of Iranian opposition groups, such as the son of the late Shah, the Iranian-Kurdish Separatists and the National Council for the Iranian Resistance (an organization on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations). The problem is that these groups not only lack the popular support among the large majority of Iranians; they actually generate great antipathy from most Iranians. The son of the Shah, whatever his personal qualities, represents a discredited monarchy, and corrupt family that has no appeal even to those who hate the clerics that replaced the Shah. Thousands have turned out in Iranian Kurdistan for anti-regime and pro-Kurdish demonstrations. And the Iranian and Kurdish parties do have popular support.

The military arm for the National Council for the Iranian Resistance is the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq of Iran (MEK); it has thousands of fighters and tons of military equipment in its base in central Iraq.

The MEK has had the ability to stage military actions inside Iran—deemed terrorists attacks by both the Iranians and the United States. It has very little support. It was allied with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and in 1991 Saddam used MEK fighters to attack the Kurds when they staged their uprising, which MEK helped put down with great ferocity.

As a consultant for ABC news, I was in Iraq in April of 2003 just after the war. I visited the MEK camp in central Iraq, called Camp Ashraf. What I saw resembled more a cult than a political movement, with men and women reciting the party line and the praises of Maryam Rajavi, their leader, in almost zombie-like fashion. In what was a comic propaganda exercise, stark-clad young women in military fatigues appearing to service the tanks they had. The most amazing set of mechanics, they didn't have any grease on them. And at that time the MEK was going out of its base and collecting abandoned Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and Howitzers and bringing them into base as U.S. troops watched and as American commanders made courtesy calls on them.

Even today, the MEK continues to exist in Iraq although Iraq's government is under control of people who aren't vehement enemies; that is to say, the pro-Iranian Shi'ites and the Kurds they attacked in 1991. The Iranian government follows the MEK activities very closely, just as we follow the activities of Al-Qaeda. It does not require much imagination to see what conclusions the Iranians may draw from the continued existence inside of American occupied Iraq of a U.S. designated terrorist organization. Especially in circumstances where they know the government of Iraq hates that organization. And seeing the curious longevity of the Mujahedin Khalq it's not hard for Iran to imagine that the Bush administration is doing what its neo-conservative allies loudly say should be doing—mainly supporting a whole range of anti-regime groups, the Kurds, the son of the Shah and others. So, even if we are not providing significant support or any support at all—and

we're certainly not providing effective support—that may not be how the Iranians see it. They may in fact believe (based on what they observe that the U.S. is engaged in and what we say we are doing) that we are supporting groups that are seeking the violent overthrow of their government including groups that we ourselves admit are terrorists.

Regime change is, of course, desirable in Iran. Iran's clerical regime is undemocratic, reflects anti-American sentiment, and clearly unrepresentative of the large part of the Iranian electorate who twice voted for a reformist president by landslides (who was then blocked from accomplishing anything meaningful by the ruling clerics). Yet one of the alternatives, including the MEK, may be worse than what is in Tehran today. But, as in Iraq, this administration has confused the desirable with the feasible. The forces that we are backing have no chance of winning. And given America's low standing in the Greater Middle East, U.S. support to a broad-based Iranian democratic movement is likely to be counterproductive, indeed even the kiss of death.

But President Bush's strategy is worse than just ineffective. Based on what their agents report from Iran and Bush's own rhetoric, Iranians believe, as I said before, that the U.S. is fomenting violence against the regime inside Iran. This puts us in the worst possible position: seen as taking action that invites retaliation against U.S. troops without actually accomplishing anything. The net result of the Iranian perception (that the U.S. supports violence against the regime) is to strengthen Iran's resolve to pursue its nuclear options and to reinforce those in Iran who believe in the justified use of violence against the U.S. interest, including support of terrorism. This administration's Iran policy has been counterproductive in terms of restraining Iran's nuclear program or terrorist activities while being ineffective in pursuit of regime change. As usual, this administration and its ideological

supporters have focused on trying to do what they believe is the right thing without focusing on getting the right results.

Now, as noted, there are two possible strategies for dealing with Iran's nuclear program—diplomacy and producing airstrikes. Iran's nuclear facilities are disbursed, many are buried deep underground beyond what can be destroyed by conventional weapons. Many may be unknown to international inspectors and even to U.S. intelligence, which turns out not to be quite as good as we wish it was. Even so, producing the fissile material in sufficient quantities to make a nuclear weapon does require sophisticated industrial facilities. Bombing these facilities would do damage and while the bombing goes on, few scientists, engineers, and other specialists are likely to want to go to work.

Even if the United States cannot destroy all Iran's nuclear facilities from the air, they probably can use air power to cause significant delay and perhaps indefinite delay, if the attacks are sustained. The real problem with the military option is, of course, Iran's ability to retaliate. I distinguish this from the full-scale invasion and I talk about the option that is being talked about in Washington. U.S. troops in Iraq are an easy mark, especially since Iran's allies dominate Iraq's central government and security forces. Moreover, the security forces of the Iraqi government that we supply includes significant numbers of Iranian-trained militia men. But Iran can also respond by closing down its own oil production and disrupting oil tanker traffic to the Straits of Hormuz, both of which would have devastating consequences for the world to come. Iran also has the ability to launch terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in the Middle East and elsewhere. Iran likely would respond to an attack on its nuclear facilities by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ending all cooperation with international atomic agency inspectors which would make a long term solution to Iran's nuclear issue much more difficult.

I think it's clear that a diplomatic solution is preferable to a military one. The question is what is achievable, whether it is achievable, but of course, we cannot know unless we actually try. In order to strike a deal with Iran, it is important to understand why Iran might want nuclear weapons. We must, in other words, put ourselves in the shoes of the Iranians. To do this we should appreciate that Iran's leaders have two broad reasons why they may want nuclear weapons: The first reason is security and the second is prestige. As Iran contemplates its security environment, as Peter Liotta referred to in his introduction, it sees a mixed picture. While hated regimes to the east and west are gone, U.S. forces are in Afghanistan and in Iraq, as well as the Persian Gulf to the south and Central Asia to the north. The Bush administration says it invaded Iraq to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and was surprised to learn that they did not exist, which they genuinely thought were there. But the Iranians widely believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq precisely because we knew that they did not have WMD. So while the Bush administration would say that the lesson of Iraq is that it is very dangerous and risky if you are a rogue state and develop WMD (particularly nuclear weapons). The Iranians may come to exactly the opposite conclusion—it's very risky not to have these weapons.

Prestige is another reason Iran may want nuclear weapons. Iranians think of themselves, and with good reason, as belonging to a powerful state with a rich culture dating back more than 2,500 years. They see themselves as superior to the Arabs to their south and west and to the Pakistanis to the east. And the fact that Iran was for centuries the only Shi'ite-ruled state in the world also creates their sense of exceptionalism. Nuclear weapons are the attribute of a great power. As one Iraqi leader told me during a recent trip, "The Iranians will never accept that Pakistan has nuclear weapons while they do not".

The question is: Can a deal be constructed that accommodates Iran's desire for security and prestige short of Iran actually acquiring nuclear weapons? Given that Iran sees the United States as its main military threat, it seems unlikely that the current negotiating track would likely succeed. Certainly Iran would want the U.S. to be part of any deal. What security guarantees, assurances, might Iran want as part of a deal? And again, there's no guarantee that this is going to work, but let's try to think creatively. What might they want? At the top of the list they would want to know that the United States will not try to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Even if the current U.S. efforts for regime change are laughably inept, no foreign government wants the most powerful nation in the world committed to its overthrow. So certainly part of a U.S.-Iran bargain might trade an Iranian commitment to stop its nuclear activities, however defined, for a U.S. promise to abandon regime change, rhetorically, as a substantive policy choice.

A U.S.-Iran deal may be flushed out with the U.S. taking action against the MEK in Iraq, a group that we describe as terrorists. And as a signal of lesser intentions, the U.S. might agree to relax many of the unilateral sanctions that have been in place on Iran since the 1979 hostage crisis. Now, we know in this list of things that I am proposing the U.S. do, we are not actually giving up anything. In abandoning regime change, we are abandoning a policy that has no chance of success. And in proposing that we lift sanctions, we're lifting sanctions that no longer have an economic impact on Iran, but are seen by Iran as evidence of U.S. hostilities.

Now addressing the prestige factor, the sense that Iran is a great country and that great countries have nuclear weapons, that may be more difficult. But Iran's sense of its own greatness has a corollary. It has a sense that it is a great country that has not been respected in the world and, in

particular, not by the United States. Khomeini's anger at the United States in 1979, very much went back to the U.S. role in the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran's democratically elected prime minister, and reinstalled the Shah. A coup about which the CIA man responsible for it, Archibald Roosevelt, went around boasting of his own role, rubbing salt in the wounds. It was an event that even in 1979 few Americans remembered but all the Iranian revolutionaries still seethed in anger over the event.

For Khomeini and his colleagues, humiliating the United States for 444 days in the hostage crisis was a justified payback for that earlier humiliation which we ourselves didn't really even remember. Now, nearly fifty-five years later, Iranians still resent the U.S. for that event. Well, the United States cannot undo history, but the United States can treat Iran with the respect its leaders and people feel they deserve. Right now we flatter Iran's sense of its own greatness by making it the central focus of our hostility. It would cost nothing to act as if Iran believes we think it's a great power, heir to a rich civilization, but without the hostility. One place to begin might be to express regret, even apologize for the U.S. role in Mossadegh's overthrow. Certainly this doesn't reflect on anybody currently active in policy and it was clearly a horrific mistake for which we have paid. So why not say that?

We also have to be realistic about what can be achieved. Although now the man in charge, Iran's President Ahmadinejad has made the country's uranium enrichment program a matter of national pride. Iran is not likely to agree to abandon it. But Iran has also said it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons. It is cooperating as required by the NPT IAEA and if sanctions were lifted it would agree to more IAEA inspections. Further, in the recent past it has offered to limit enrichment activities and have them conducted by international consortium and not by Iran alone. Yes, it's true that a U.S.-Iran deal would lead Iran further along the road to nuclear weapons in a sense that they

will have mastery over one part of the technology. But it could leave Iran well short of actually having nuclear weapons. Now could a deal be constructed such as the one I have outlined here? Well, in fact, in 2003 the Iranians presented through the Swiss a paper very much along those terms.

Now at that time the U.S. power was much greater, just after the takeover of Iraq, it was not so immediately clear what a disaster it was and Khatami, not Ahmadinejad, was the President.

Nonetheless, it was we who rejected it, brushed aside this Iranian proposal. Nonetheless, I think that approach could be the basis for a settlement.

Let me just touch briefly on the other points. With regard to stability in Iraq, I'm totally against making any deal with Iran on that point. It is in their interest, much more than it is in ours, that their friends succeed and if we cut out the hostility and in fact get out of Iraq, most of Iraq—I'm still in favor of keeping forces in Kurdistan—I think that issue will resolve itself. I think in Iran where there was a deal would have its own incentives to cut back on some of its support of radicals and certainly have its own economic reasons to maintain oil supplies. There is, of course, no assurance that a U.S.-Iran deal could be constructed. As Iran's president forcefully employs his own rhetoric on evil, of which countries are good and evil, this seems as adverse to negotiation as the Bush administration. But even if a deal cannot be reached in the short term, the process of negotiating may buy time, not just for Iran to develop nuclear weapons but for reasonable leaders to replace the increasingly unpopular Ahmadinejad.

In the end, the U.S. may face a choice between acquiescing to an Iranian nuclear weapon or unilateral military action with all the associated risks. An Iranian military nuclear attack will be an unmitigated disaster for the Greater Middle East. I think Iran is not at all likely to share nuclear

technology or weapons, unlike the supposed U.S. ally Pakistan, and because it knows that should there be an act of nuclear terrorism against the U.S. it would be the almost certain return address (unless the return address were otherwise known). It is clearly undesirable for a state hostile to the U.S. to have nuclear weapons. It's clearly undesirable for one more country to have nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear weapons are also likely to accelerate the nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both countries with potentially unstable regimes threatened by Sunni Islamic fundamentalists. But the alternative, as disastrous as an Iranian nuclear weapon may be, the consequences one also has to recognize, is that a military strike is also likely to have unforeseen and potentially devastating consequences.

Given that we have no good alternatives, President Bush's reluctance to negotiate makes no strategic sense. It is yet another example of ideology accompanying strategy. And let me just conclude by quoting President Kennedy who in his inaugural address in 1961 said "We should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear to negotiate." That ought to be our approach to Iran. I am really pleased to conclude this address with those words, because as it began with Peter's words of what my father wrote in his book, he also wrote those words in President Kennedy's speech.

[NOTE: The reference here is to the concluding words to John Kenneth Galbraith's final book, *The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time* (2004), which are: "War remains the decisive human failure." These words also conclude Ambassador Galbraith's *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End* (2006).]