



Pell Center
for International Relations
and Public Policy
100 Ochre Point Avenue
Newport, Rhode Island 02840-4129

Lt. General (Ret.), the Honorable

Roméo A. Dallaire

THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY TO PREVENT GENOCIDE

**Remarks to the Pell Center
for International Relations and Public Policy**

March 27th, 2006



Photo by Newport Daily News

Thank you very much for the introduction. I am very happy and proud to be here amongst you this evening to speak of a topic that is not one to keep us serene or at ease but on the contrary calls upon us to question how we see not only our loved ones, but the rest of the human beings who surround us and even those who are far away and, in these times, even question how we perceive humanity, how we perceive the planet. How we perceive potentially, the communion, we hope, between the planet, the environment and humanity and how all are going to be able to continue to coexist positively into the future.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am going to speak for about forty-five minutes and I'm going to "Power Talk" as my Marine Corps friends taught me so that I can get as much information through. Being that I'm a soldier, I'm a very visual person so I'm going to use every pedagogical tool I can. So I'm going to use PowerPoint, which is the norm, I suppose, for military briefings in the past and I hope it to be at least useful to make some of the points this evening.

I'm going to speak to you this evening in North American English, not my mother tongue. My mother tongue is Québécois or as some of my less than friendly friends from France would call "eighteenth-century French." I learned North American English which is a mixture of Webster and Oxford pronunciation in Eastern Montreal. As a young French-Canadian Catholic boy, I used to go to a cub [scout] pack in the basement of an English Protestant school. So on Tuesday nights, I'd go to Cubs and on Wednesday mornings I'd go to confession.

I learned a rhyme that my fellow members of my six pack taught me because they wanted a chance to win the [scout] pennant every now and again. It's a boy's rhyme, it doesn't offend and it goes something like this: "When you're out with your honey, and your nose is

runny, don't think it's funny, 'cause it's not." It took me a year and a half to figure that out, and so ladies and gentlemen I hope that my pronunciation won't offend this evening.

We will go through an exercise, if I may call it, of a bit of history. A bit further than CNN history, that is a bit farther than last week, not too far, however—mostly bringing us back to around the end of the Cold War, 1989ish and essentially come through the 1990s with you as we move through this new millennium, new century, new decade that we're currently in.

I argue that we are in a new era. Some have qualified it as postmodern, and I'm not too sure on the parameters of that, but it is to me a new era of something that has happened, that is not in the norm of change. At times, I've even called it a revolutionary era – that sometimes makes people nervous, but you shouldn't be nervous if a retired general speaks of revolution because he's got his pension and so on; however, if a colonel speaks about revolution—then you have to be very concerned and listen attentively.

In this timeframe, we have found ourselves facing some of the most significant human catastrophes of our timeframes, some natural, but the bulk of them man-made. So the question is: What of humanity in this era? This era where so many parameters have changed including the fact that we are global. We are in a village. We actually articulated that concept and we're trying to figure out whether globalism is a positive tool or a pejorative instrument that can oppress, if not suppress, the opportunities of many peoples of the world to get out of their very difficult situations, be they economic or political.

I think that globalism is, as it matures, going to be one of the greatest assets that humanity is going to have. I believe that we are actually going to be able to speak as the whole of humanity. We're going to be able to communicate with it and potentially influence it in its whole.

And so, this evening, what I would like to do is show a bit of this recent history in these complex times and argue that we are in a very ambiguous timeframe and argue, I hope, that we simply cannot sit and watch humanity evolve, but that we have to participate in it, particularly we of the “have” nations. You know that 20 percent of humanity that’s working very hard to get to Mars, and as we do so, we sometimes pretentiously argue that humanity is actually advancing because we are mastering technology and our thought processes are so well advanced.

But you would wonder then, how can we actually say, if we’re so smart, that humanity is actually advancing when 80 percent of the world is still in the blood, the mud, the suffering and inhumane conditions. This is a position that has rendered many of the decisions of this era to be seen sometimes, as less than advancing the whole of humanity, but instead advantaging only certain portions thereof.

So as we look at this time-frame, I thought that I’d use this reference of a great American philosopher, who at times played baseball who said this many decades ago. [Dallaire points to a slide with the Yogi Berra quote: “The future ain’t what it used to be.”] Berra was very troubled at the end of WWII and with that great pragmatism that he had, he looked around and everything seemed to be shifting so much that there were no reference points. And I would argue that we are in exactly that same sort of scenario, but nearly a thousand times more so; that, in fact, this is not an era of change, but an era of significant transformation, if not revolution. This is a time where we can maximize what’s available to us.

And the argument for that is this. [Dallaire points to a slide with Cold War tactical maneuvers.] This is pre-1989. This is nearly simplistic when we look back at that timeframe, the balance of good guys, bad guys. This is the classic era, or the culmination of the classic concept of security, of course under that nuclear umbrella balance. But essentially, it was a very

Eurocentric way of looking at the world and at power and at control and it gave us that sense of security because we had these massive investments in humans and in technology and equipment to keep a sort of balance across some line in Europe. And as long as that balance was there, we could continue to do our thing and continue to advance. We hoped our society would continue arguments around the advancement of humanity and human thought.

And so that balance was the culmination, during the Cold War, of every classic dimension of security of the use of force or more appropriately the threat of the use of force in creating an atmosphere of security or of a certain serenity under which we operated. And that is what, at the end of the Cold War, people expected to continue to happen, maybe in a bit of a different format, when many of us started to speak of the peace dividend of this end of the Cold War. We were wondering if there was another exercise that might be evolving. And what we saw was the Gulf War which permitted the conservatives to say “No, it’s going to be a continuation of pretty much the same.” And this is a conservative classic general’s dream. [Dallaire points to a U.S.-Coalition forces maneuver map of Iraq in 1991] It’s a small map. It’s got its very simple plan. We’re going to do a right flanking with big arrows and one morning Norman Schwarzkopf woke up, looked at the entrails of pigeons, and said, “We’re going.”

And when he gave that order, the force he had available to him was comprised of 600,000 men and women with the most advanced application of technology and weaponry, with forty-five years of development through the Cold War, and with very extensive training and doctrine to apply. That force had a sustainment capability, through logistics, that was second to none and he took on—in a very classic sense—another army in the field across a line in the sand. That army was there with its uniforms, with its tanks also prepared for a classic

encounter of attrition. The problem was, we were operating under World War III capabilities and he [Hussein] was operating under World War I capabilities. At the end of it, it was discerned that we had won that war and it ended.

However, that operation and three years ago the American-led coalition again into that same zone using all the classic instruments of war, were the only two times in the last sixteen years where classic warfare actually functioned, happened. For the rest of the time, it has been a whole different set of parameters and scenarios and we've seen a whole different set of consequences. It became very evident the minute the American-led coalition hit the gates of Baghdad. Where did that army go? And how come they're still shooting? Why is it still so deadly? And why aren't they in uniforms anymore? And what are they doing dressed like that and totally integrated into society? We realized then, that we were no longer in the application of force in the classic sense. We realized that we had entered a whole different set of parameters in the use of force, in security and in the impact thereof. We also realized in that same timeframe that the classic peacekeeping concepts weren't functioning anymore, either.

This is my mission. [Dallaire points to a map of Rwanda in 1993 with areas controlled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and areas controlled by the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) clearly delineated.] This is what I was requested by the UN to perform. This mission was a classic Chapter VI peacekeeping mission where two belligerents had finally come to a peace agreement. There was north of the demilitarized zone, 12,000 rebel troops, and below it about 30,000 government troops, and they needed a referee.

The concept of the referee, which was the United Nations Blue Berets, was created in 1956 by Lester Pearson in the Suez Canal crisis. It is essentially as a referee with no penalty box, but a referee who could, however, observe, report, bring people together to resolve the problems, the frictions and continue to advance the peace process that both sides wanted.

And that was essentially the peacekeeping concept that was used extensively in the Cold War, only to find out during this timeframe that this exercise didn't work anymore.

We found out that it wasn't the simplicity of conflicting countries going at each other for whatever parameters they were trying to establish, but that instead we were in an imploding nation and that while the reasons for the frictions were not obvious—pure power or control of territory—that they had far more ramifications in the arena of ethnicity, in the area of religion, in the arena of economic structures within the country.

And so we found ourselves in a timeframe of not facing classic conflict or classic war versus peace, but much more complex scenarios. Scenarios that could be described as conflict. And so as we moved into the 1990s, what we used to have as war at one end of the spectrum and peace at the other end with not really much in between, ended up being not really war and not really peace anymore with a whole area in between—a vacuum which was now filled with all kinds of complex conflicts. Everything from the more or less benign [situation] of Haiti to the far more complex ones like Afghanistan, which is still on-going, where my country is sending 2,000 troops to deploy them in the Kandahar region.

And so there is a whole spectrum of these catastrophes within imploding, failing states. And the question becomes, what are the parameters in which we can function in that area to bring assistance, to bring an atmosphere of security to permit people to constitute themselves in democratic processes, through good systems of governance, bringing human rights, the rule of law and actually see them, hopefully, strive in a competitive structure.

Well instead of the era described, maybe in an optimistic sense by George Bush, Senior, as the New World Order, we seemed to have entered a new world disorder. We seemed to have entered something far more complicated. We realized the state of affairs in these coun-

tries was brought more and more to our attention, by the catastrophic failures that were going on and affecting humanity, human beings in large scale.

We also saw the extreme of how humanity was abusing itself not only through ethnic cleansing, which is the polite term that was used in ex-Yugoslavia, to the intrastate conflicts that were the nature of the beast, and even to genocide. And even when we did articulate that there was a genocide, did we fully comprehend the impact of it and did we respond to that term, *genocide*? Did we respond to that extreme that was articulated after WWII that we never wanted to repeat again? Never again. And yet, we faced it and it was overt and in front of us, on television on a nightly basis.

We then saw a move to global terrorism which is now the fate of the developed world where terrorism is one of those parameters of insecurity and certainly the U.S. has suffered from that and your neighbors have felt the compassion of that incredible suffering. September 11th, 2001 is of great significance to the developed world and sometimes understated, I believe, by our European colleagues in what this has done to the American psyche. We look on and see in these events something that's changed the nature of the American psyche. There is a vulnerability that has snuck in there that never existed before. And that vulnerability has had ramifications in decisions, in how the U.S. looks at itself and at the world. We'll touch upon that a bit later.

And lastly, and I threw that in because it is significant player in this timeframe as we panic and try to reestablish what are overarching boundaries in this complex era, we saw the legalization of mercenaries, better known as security companies or security establishments. It was rather interesting that in the recent Hurricane Katrina catastrophe in New Orleans where we saw so much damage, that the first few people who were in there doing some pretty significant work, were not the National Guard or the police, but these security companies, paid for

by companies to go in and provide security for their establishments or their particular protected areas.

These people are not held accountable. These people work under contract. These people do not commit themselves, as the military of sovereign states do, to the unlimited liability to the mission. These people function to the next paycheck and so this begs the question: What is their *ethos* and that of their organizations? About six months ago, I was in South Africa where they have now rendered participation in these security companies illegal. With the disappearance of Apartheid in 1994 about 10,000 white South African soldiers launched themselves into these companies. And so the South African government has rendered it illegal for individuals to join them.

It is rather interesting that in Iraq, there are 25,000 of these characters hired in a whole variety of functions, including going in there and shooting, and participating in the operation. Is that the solution? How do you function with these people? What are the contractual arrangements? What are their ethics? What values do they apply and ultimately to what extent do they commit themselves to the mission or put another way, to the contract?

And so this era in which we found ourselves, how did we stumble into it? How did we fall into it as opposed to anticipate it, as opposed to our great leaders moving us down a road where we could have expected it?

This guy [Dallaire point to picture of Juvenal Habyarimana, president of Rwanda in 1994] was a dictator for many years. He came to power after the colonial era in the late 1950s, early 60s as in many countries. As a dictator, he ran the country of Rwanda with a single party and an all-encompassing authority. He was there because we wanted him there. He was there because in that great balance of the East and the West, we went and bought off a whole bunch of demagogues and autocrats and dictators. We didn't want to find ourselves in fric-

tion with the East over problems of the internal adjustments of nations, in places like Tanzania or the Congo, who were in the process of creating themselves after the long colonial era.

And so one of the best way to try to avoid such frictions was to have someone in power in so many of those nations who would avoid the frictions from happening in the first place and would keep autocratic power. And this guy [Habyarimana] was bought off by us. At first, the Chinese and the Russians built the roads in Rwanda; subsequently the American and the British built the soccer stadium. And so there was “to-ing” and “fro-ing” throughout so many of these states as they gained their independence and this “to-ing” and “fro-ing” wasn’t there to institute the capabilities of these nation-states to move down democratic processes as independent states, based on the rule of law, but on the contrary: the countries found themselves under the strong arm of so many of these hard dictators and autocrats.

But in 1989, the show ended. In 1989, we turned to these same people, as the Cold War ended and as we won it, and we told them that we didn’t need them anymore and that they needed to sort themselves out. And by doing so, we wanted to immediately move them into a different application of the democratic process and we were very impatient for them to do so. And so, we have the case of Rwanda, where you have a country that for nearly a century and a half was under colonial rule, then for nearly 30 years was under a dictator or two, then all of a sudden ended up in a civil war and finally signed a peace agreement. So they expected me to bring a peacekeeping force and within two years have a democratic election process in a country that had never understood the capabilities or the principles of a multi-party system of democracy. They were given two years and if they didn’t do it, they wouldn’t get the money from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank because they weren’t meeting their criteria. We created a whole series of very complex and difficult milestones for

so many of these countries to be able to shift gears one hundred and eighty degrees and move to a democratic process that we expected them to move toward, and that *we* felt was essential. By doing so, we exacerbated so many of the frictions and created that much more tension, tension which ultimately led to catastrophic failures.

And so in the 1990s, we found ourselves in a whole series of imploding nations. Places that we had never expected ever to go, places we knew very little about and certainly places where we thought, superficially, that we had the answers to. So the nature of the insecurity of that time can probably be best described as two-fashioned.

On the one hand, we had the humanitarian catastrophe that degenerates into a security problem such as Somalia. Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced. Millions . . . Ultimately ten of thousands of people are dying because of the lack of food, water and medical supplies. The system of governance, the infrastructure is gone. We pour in all kinds of capabilities in there to assist them. However, all of a sudden, the local warlords start to reconstitute themselves to take advantage and lo and behold we're in a shooting exercise and eighteen rangers are killed and seventy-two are injured. And seeing the bodies in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, we pull out. And in so doing abandon not only the UN forces that were there, but we abandon the hundreds of thousands of Somalis who were looking to us to establish that atmosphere of security in order for them to be able to solve the humanitarian catastrophe.

The other scenario is the Rwanda scenario. That is to say a security situation that degenerates into a humanitarian catastrophe. We've got a country in a civil war; it signs a peace agreement. A whole bunch of people in that peace agreement sign under duress. They start maneuvering behind the scenes, arming and training militias. We then have assassinations. We have small scale massacres. We have riots and yet more assassinations. There is political

stagnation and lack of involvement by the international community to resolving this stagnation. We have more riots and it degenerates ultimately into a civil war that ends up a genocide. And so we have two general scenarios of that timeframe that are still with us today. I remind you of Darfur.



And so we found ourselves in an era of these imploding nations all over the place with solutions that were not necessarily well

thought out. Nor did we try to grasp the initiative away from those who didn't necessarily want to move down the road of democracy. How many Security Council Resolutions did we need for ex-Yugoslavia? And every time we pulled one in, they [Yugoslav authorities] always outwitted us. We never seemed to be able to get ahead of the game to bring them to resolution. And why? Because those people are not dummies, even though we often went in saying, "We have the solution for you. We know how to sort *your* problems out."

This is part of the campaign plan of General [Paul] Kagame. [Dallaire points to a slide.] General Kagame is a graduate of the United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The forces on the other side, the government forces were graduates of *l'Ecole de Guerre de Paris* and *l'Ecole de Guerre de Bruxelles*. These people were educated in the same schools that we were and they passed. So they know how to manipulate their populations, their people. They know how to maneuver the international community. They know how to gain power and maintain it and how to function with it. And so we face elites of enormous competency and depth and they know the terrain. They know the culture. They know the nuances for which we as neophytes attempt to bring solutions from the outside.

We entered an era that all of a sudden, was totally contrary to what we expected. This is not high-tech. [Dallaire points to a slide of a young man with a machete.] This is a militiaman, half drugged up with a couple of grenades and a machete. Not really a threat when there's only one of them. Except there's never one. They're in the hundreds, the thousands. For in so many of these countries, so much of the youth is disenfranchised because of overpopulation and the infrastructure of the nation is not able to absorb them. They end up in these urban areas where they are an easy target for someone to walk by, throw a couple of dollars at them, even give them a machete or a rifle and say "You know, we can make somebody out of you." And then sneak in the idea that "Hey, maybe we can do something about this 'problem'. You know these people are different." And ultimately this becomes the recruitment and mobilization of thousands upon thousands of totally disenfranchised youth who then commit themselves to the extremes for they *have absolutely nothing to lose*. How do we counteract that? Do we shoot the whole lot of them? How do we maneuver with them as we try to integrate them into society?

And what about the new weapon systems of that era? A nine year-old with an AK-47. When we ended the Cold War, we didn't go and smash up a whole bunch of the weaponry that we had. On the contrary, we upgraded and many of the weapons that were in the ebbing part of the Cold War were like these. [Dallaire points to the slide of a young boy with an AK-47.] They were very light weapons, small arms, very efficient, very easy to maintain, very easy to shoot machine guns. There are over 600 million of these in distribution in the world. And so what we saw in this timeframe was the introduction of the child soldier.

Everything from the boy and girl out front doing the shooting, all the way back to those who are used simply as weights to walk through minefields to blow up the mines and back to the logistics base where the girls are not only running logistics, but they're also the sex-slaves

and the bush-wives. It is the most effective weapon system anywhere—also very cheap and expendable. You just go into a village and steal some more. What do you do facing that threat?

One of my sergeants entered a village during the operation, in the latter part of the genocide, and as he was taking stock of this village which had been massacred, the chapel doors of the village opened and about a hundred people came out. That, in itself was unusual because what would normally happen is that the extremists would tell people who felt unsafe to go into the churches, into the missions because by convention they would be protected. And once they were chock-o-block full, the extremists would surround the church, the mission, send in the militiamen and they'd kill the people. Mostly, they'd injure them by machete so they'd bleed over a couple of days. They'd go row by row by row. Every church ended up as a slaughterhouse. It was very efficient.

In this case, they hadn't killed yet in that church and so the sergeant got on the radio to call my headquarters for transport to move those people to a safer place. And as he's on the radio, calling for transport, from one edge of the village he sees about thirty of these boys aged nine, ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen and they open fire on the sergeant, the fifteen soldiers of his patrol, and the civilians with them. And as they're reeling from this, from the other edge of the village, he sees about twenty girls. They are the same ages, some of them are pregnant and they are human shields behind which others boys are shooting at the sergeant, his soldiers and the people he's protecting. And the question for the sergeant is what do you do? He doesn't have an hour and a half. He's got nanoseconds. The bullets are flying and they're already taking casualties. *Do you kill children who kill?*

Do you kill children who've been held under duress, abducted, brought into the bush and lined up—with a couple of them killed outright? A few of them are brought back to the vil-

lage to kill some elders to make it impossible for them to ever return. They are paired, two by two. If one escapes, the other one is killed. They're not exactly sure of what threat they're facing and they're often drugged up. Do you kill children who kill?

We had soldiers in this era facing dilemmas of this nature. What is the tactical training solution to this situation? What is the reference to our ethics and morals, to our values? And so we had soldiers, some of them who came out of these operations—and still do—traumatized. Because every now and again, they're invaded by the memories. And when they're invaded, they can still hear the sergeant giving the order to fire. And they feel their finger pulling the trigger. And they feel the rifle in their shoulder, and the whole memory is digitally clear and in slow motion. They see the cartridges flying out of the rifle and they're looking through the sight and they're seeing the head of a child explode.

Was that the right answer in this situation? Can we live with that answer? How did we end up in that scenario? How is it possible that over 300,000 children are used as main combatants in so many of these conflicts? How is it possible, as Graça Machel [widow of Samora Machel (the first president of Mozambique) and current wife of Nelson Mandela], the leading expert on this problem, has estimated that over two million children have been killed over the last six years? And they are killed because once they're injured they're just left to die in the bush.

And so a whole new threat. How do you handle that and how do you respond to it? How do we react to the nature of a conflict that has moved away from professional soldiers in uniforms with all their equipment doing battles of attrition as we, in the nation-states, came to be used to? We have our politicians and our diplomats and they try to solve problems. When that doesn't work out, they turn to the generals they say "Take our youth. Go out there. Fight and win." It's not working like that anymore because the general population has

become an instrument of war. So massacring, mutilating, barbarism, rape have become instruments of war because by using them you create fear.

When you create fear, then through the horror of it, you gain control of the people and you can maneuver them and create humanitarian catastrophes. You can create power bases from which to function. And so we saw a surge of outright barbarism using the population. We have seen rape as an instrument of conflict to instill fear. Raping young women and girls. In Darfur they're using rape in order to impregnate the African-based Darfurian women in order to create another race that would not be African-based and not Arab-based and could then be used against the African-based Darfurians down the road. We stumbled into this as we saw from our perspective, not peace, but on the contrary conflict on a scale that we hadn't anticipated even in our wildest dreams.

[Dallaire points to a map of Rwanda with “x” and “o”.] The “X’s” represent 2.3 million people. The “O’s” were refugees around Rwanda. They represent 1.6 million internally displaced people who have *nothing*. How do you feed 3.9 million people twice a day? How many trucks do you need to carry the food, medical supplies, and water? What do you bring them and in what priority? What methodology do you use to bring it to them?



We ended up with thousand of tons of corn, maize. Now the normal corn, which is the one we eat, is sweet corn and it is delicious and all that. The corn that's given in these circumstances is cow corn, hard as rock with jagged ends. Now in normal circumstances if these people were in established camps, they'd have instruments and they'd break it down, put water into it, heat it up, make it a paste and it would be edible. Except in this situation, these people are running for their lives. They're carrying *noth-*

ing. They're in constant fear. They're being slaughtered as they're running. And so they have nothing to break down the maize. They can't get to the water because if they do they're raped or killed on the way. In any event, all the rivers and lakes are full of bodies and there was already all sorts of sickness in the water. And a small banana forest on the side of a hill that has 50,000 people doesn't last very long. And so the people couldn't heat the maize up. We ended up with all kinds of aid, but it was totally useless. And then we discovered a whole bunch of children bleeding to death all of a sudden because they were starving and they were eating the corn and the jagged edges were ripping the inside of their stomachs. How do you handle that—and *who* handles that?

So a whole new group of people came on the line. The mom-and-pop outfits with lots of heart but absolutely no capabilities. They're a liability the minute they hit the ground. The big, big outfits with lots of capabilities and maybe not that much heart because what they're doing, very often, is playing to the media because they know there's going to be another catastrophe and they have to have these pictures in order to get funds for the next chaos. And how do they function in their neutrality? How do they end up, all of a sudden, aiding and abetting the conflict?

People are starving. People are injured. We have to get through the line, so we buy off the warlord with 20 percent tax on what we're carrying. Is that ethical? Is it ethical to take that 20 percent that is absolutely needed by those people out there who won't get it and will probably die or suffer for the lack of it? And that 20 percent they gave to the warlord, he will use it to aid and abet his campaign with it. He will probably create even more people who are suffering and displaced and so on. Was that the right solution? Is that an ethical solution or is there another way about it?

Well, we certainly can't work with the military because it will destroy our neutrality. And so we have cases, as I've seen in the field, where military doctors and nurses with Red Crosses on them come to these small NGOs tents where hundreds of people are waiting to be helped and the few NGO doctors in the tents are totally overworked. Those doctors turn and see these military people with the Red Crosses and say, "Hey, you can't work here. We must remain neutral, so we don't get involved in the conflict." And so they throw out the military doctors even though people are dying at the door because they can't take care of them. That sense of neutrality of the past, is that still the instrument? And how do we function together? We stumbled upon each other in these operations.

What was starting to make the scenario more complex was the ethical and moral and legal dilemma. There was a radio—there was very little TV in Rwanda—called *Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines* (RTL). It was a very interesting outfit. When the parties signed the peace agreements, some businessmen and a couple of politicians got together and created this radio station. Rwanda is a radio-based society. Everybody has a radio. There are nearly no TVs or newspapers. In some villages, the radio was nearly the voice of God. So they created a radio station that really attracted people's attention. It had great music, great programming. Everybody loved it. Every now and again, they snuck in a little comment about the other guys, "Oh, we have to watch them . . . the peace agreement . . ." and so on. And then more music and more great stuff. And then other little comments left, right and center and all of a sudden when the civil war and the genocide started, the station showed its true colors and it was a genocidal radio that explained to people how to kill and how to mutilate. Because it was important to mutilate. "Make them suffer." They would explain how to extract the fetus from the womb of a woman so she could suffer for as long as possible with-

out dying. And they would tell where to go find the Tutsis and how and where they were hiding and so on and so forth. And it did this for *one hundred days*.

And I argued with the UN and with sovereign states including my own country saying, “Hey, I need somebody to find where that emitter is and you guys either jam it or tell me where it is so I can blow it up.” And the responses I was getting were, “Well, you know you can’t do that because Rwanda is a sovereign state, and, as a sovereign state, we cannot intervene.”

Do you negotiate with extremists, militiamen who have just killed that morning, just hours before, who still have blood on them? Do you actually negotiate in order to save some people to move them between the lines? And the extremists argue with you about what is the best route and they say “Okay, you can take that route and we’ll stop the slaughter there and there and there so you can go through.” *Do you actually negotiate with the devil?* Is that right? Is that okay?

And so, ladies and gentlemen, we were in an era of incredible complexities and difficulties only to find out that it was exacerbated by the fact that those who were sent to help were also targets in the process. When the eighteen rangers were killed in October 1993 in Mogadishu, the rules of the game changed. There was a sense by the U.S. government that there was no way that the American people would support troops dying in a country that was of absolutely no self-interest to the United States. The country is not a threat. It has no strategic value. We were there to help people. And so with the US pulling out, the fear casualties in the developed world came to the forefront. And so just a few months later, the extremists went and killed ten white Belgian soldiers and within forty-eight hours, the Belgians were pulling out their forces and convincing everybody else that we have to pull out; if not, we’d all be massacred.

So we decided that the lives of our troops were more important than the lives of the people who were there. We actually decided that we were more human than them. And as such it was more important for us than for them to stay alive and that the price of blood, because there was no self-interest was not worth it. So the extremists built on that. They continue to build on that.

My country is now in the throes of the debate of how many casualties we can sustain in Afghanistan. And there, there is a threat. And we are trying to help a nascent nation and its democracy to come to the fore. How many casualties can we sustain? It is beyond all our comprehension how this country has been able to sustain the levels of casualties of Iraq. It is extraordinary. Unexpected. Totally unexpected. And so we entered an era where in so many countries we decided that our lives were more important than theirs and as such we would not pay the price if it came down to a question of us and them in regards to accomplishing the mission of helping them establish an atmosphere of security.

So commanders in the field saw a shift in the fundamental premises that had nearly always guided them. This is how we used to look at things. [Dallaire points to a slide with a list of priorities.] The first priority is my mission. What is it? What do I need to do it? What are the casualties? What are the chances of success? You do the assessments, you negotiate with the higher authorities and then you do the mission. The second priority is your people. Are they trained, motivated and equipped? Can you sustain them? Can you help them? Can you get them medical supplies? Do they have ammunitions and the equipment to do the job right? The third priority is you. Do you have the skill, the knowledge and the experience to command? Can you sustain the stresses of command?

But all of a sudden, in this new era, we started to see that, back home, it wasn't the accomplishment of the mission that were the first priority; it was whether or not you were

bringing home casualties. And so it wasn't how many Rwandans you were saving, it was how you were ensuring that none of your soldiers were casualties. And so commanders all of a sudden, were not pushing their soldiers to maximize the already complex mandate because they didn't know to what extent they could since they were being held accountable back home for the casualties and not for the mission. And what about the soldiers as they looked at their commanders? Do they want to be the four or five or six or ten who are killed so everybody else can go home and abandon the hundreds of thousands of other human beings on the ground?

We actually entered an era where we prioritized humanity. We actually said we're more human than them, that not all humans are human, that some are more human than others. In so doing, we decided that our lives are more important. I had a country come to me, at the start of the genocide, do its assessment of the situation and report to me and say, as the bodies were piling up, "We are not going to come and reinforce your force because there's no threat to us, there's no strategic value and there's only human beings and *in extremis*, we believe that our population, our public opinion, might be able to handle for every 85,000 dead Rwandans, one casualty in our own force." [General Dallaire is referring to a phone conversation with U.S. Pentagon planners over acceptable casualties in interventions.] They actually argued a numeric value to life.

And so, indirectly at that time, we actually created a scenario where we prioritized humanity and discovered by either our inaction or our computations that Sub-Saharan black Africa was the lowest priority, particularly if there was absolutely no self-interest in the country. U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 25 published in mid-March 1994 said essentially, "Unless we have a national interest—a self-interest—in a country, we're not going in." [Note: President W. J. Clinton signed PDD-25 on May 3rd, 1994, which nominally addressed

U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (specifically United Nations Peace-keeping Operations). Although a classified document, its contents are widely known. PDD-25 is frequently considered as a template, due to its heavy restrictions on U.S. involvement in multilateral operations, for “non-involvement.”] So the president [Clinton] was right when four years after the genocide he said, “You know, I really didn’t know that it was this bad. We didn’t realize the scale of what was going on.” And the reason he could say that is because the information never got to him because while it was in the Pentagon and the State Department and in the National Security Advisor’s office, it wasn’t sent up because there was no self-interest and we didn’t want to hear about it. And so we look for excuses for our mishandling when we created this scenario of not wanting to do anything in the first place.

And so ladies and gentlemen, this is no longer good guys versus bad guys time. This is no longer a white hat versus black hat scenario.

We’re in an era of enormous complexity where ambiguity is the norm. That’s how it is. You’re not going to see clear mandates anymore. And if you have generals running



around and claiming, “I want a clear mandate and I want a clear exit strategy and I don’t want any mission creep” and all that, you tell the general he’s in the wrong era because *it will not happen!*

We are in an era where simply soldiering, just being able to fight and shoot is not enough. We need, yes, the warriors in order to provide protection for those moderates who want to build their nation in an atmosphere of security, but we also want valued added. We want them to be able to participate in the problem-solving. And so we not only need the experiential base and skills that come from the warrior’s ethics, but we also need more intellectually-

based skills for conflict-resolution. What does that mean? That means acquiring knowledge in subjects like anthropology, sociology and philosophy so that when you're in the alleyway in Port-au-Prince you can speak with the people. You're not using your rifle. It's there as a guarantee, but *you're there* as part of the discussion. You understand what's in their entrails, what's bothering them. *You* are the value-added. We're in an era where soldiering is no longer isolated war-fighting, but instead integrated into conflict resolution.

So the tools have got to change. And we're seeing the first results of that in what are called the "provincial teams" that are working in Afghanistan and are not using the Dayton concept where you had distinct military plans, diplomatic plans, humanitarian plans, nation-building plans and hoped that the leaders of these plans would cooperate and coordinate their effort. So you have all these plans on the ground and more often than not, because of friction and personalities, they will either fail and we'll have wasted internal resources, or we'll see internal fighting which brings the mission to a standstill. On rare occasions does this work.

We have to move in a different era where we integrate these capabilities. We need multi-disciplinary leadership that can function with all that together as one plan. And so we have entered the timeframe where we have to find a whole new conceptual base on how we do these things. And we're fiddling with it still, fifteen years into it.

But if that wasn't complex enough to see these imploding nations going left, right, center and exploding, we had this. [Dallaire points to a slide of the World Trade Center in flames.] This mobilized the world. 800,000 people had died a few years earlier and nobody came. With this, however, the world mobilized. And what is so significant here is that the rules of the games changed. Because terrorists don't follow any of the rules that have taken centuries upon centuries to articulate and bring into being. And so the immediate response in front of

such a complex threat is to maybe fiddle with the rules ourselves. And so I truly believe that we have now entered a complex arena of how democracies respond.

Are we throwing out the window some of the conventions that have taken so long to build up? Are we fiddling with human rights? Are we fiddling with civil rights? How far down the road do we permit ourselves to go beyond our established parameters? Do we end up in security, yes, but potentially also in a police state? Are we progressing in how we're advancing our societies in the face of this new threat or are we fiddling with a very dangerous slope which ultimately does not give us the guarantee of eliminating these threats?

And so ladies and gentlemen, we've had a checkered background over the last fifteen years in this very complex arena. We've actually had a genocide and we decided not to come. It took six weeks with over 300,000 dead and over a million displaced for the Security Council on the 17th of May 1994 to agree that it was a genocide, that I needed about 5000 troops within about ten days to be deployed—not to stop the civil war between the two belligerents, but to stop the killing *behind* the line. If I could stop the killing behind the line, the reason for the war would disappear and we would have a cease-fire. Now, only the world powers and the world middle powers have the capability of deploying that level of capabilities, of competencies on the military side to be able to conduct that type of operation.

Two months later, we're in the end of July, the war is over by nearly three weeks and the genocide is over by nearly a month and the first reinforcements arrive and they are Ethiopians who have just finished their own civil war, who didn't know how to



wear a beret, let alone a blue one. By then, another 500,000 people had been slaughtered and nearly 3 million had been internally displaced and made refugees.

Never again? Are all humans human or are some more humans than other? *We* decided *not* to go in for the price would be too high in casualties.

And so ladies and gentlemen we've got some options. We can simply hope to have survived this and fiddle as we're doing and potentially take enormous risks with our capabilities. We can build a wall to protect ourselves or we can resolve it at the source. This is conflict resolution. [Dallaire points to a slide titled "Humanitarian Intervention."] The ultimate aim would be for us to go into *conflict prevention*.

We could have prevented that genocide. *We could have prevented it!*

Secondly, if we're already in the middle of it, as we are in Darfur, we can go in and try to stabilize the crisis and end it. And thirdly, we can go in and subsequently assist them to re-constitute, bring reconciliation, the rule of law and systems of governance in those nations. That's what we can do.

Preventive deployment has been used, only once, in Macedonia—and with success. Every other time, we've come in after the fact or in the middle of it or we haven't gone at all. However, some new innovative approaches have come in. Massive human rights abuse occur, yet political will: Has it changed? Do the politicians have the courage and the determination to absorb the risk of going in, not only when there's a crisis, but going in before there's a crisis and take the risks in regards to preventing it? And do we continue to evolve under self-interest only or is there a higher plane of humanitarianism?

Well this is one of the few positive reforms in the UN that was able to squeak through last September in the General Assembly. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Finally we're putting a kibosh on the absolutism of sovereignty. If you are massively abusing your people or you

cannot solve the problem, it gives us the right to intervene to stop it. This is now a doctrine. That means we can hold the Security Council accountable. There are tools now for how we go in and if we should join a conflict. And so we can impose more stress and more demands on the Security Council because that tool is there now. The question is: Will they use it? Did we use it for Darfur?

I'm going to end by saying that this great nation here has been carrying a lot of the load in this timeframe and it has been doing it, in my belief, unnecessarily because there have been other players who have not been part of it. Regional capabilities are important and need to be developed. The African region is building up its capabilities to respond. They're creating in the region and it exists, a Chapter VIII, an ability to be the first responder. We have now moved on that road with Darfur and trying to reinforce the Darfurians. But very soon, the Africans will no longer be able to sustain that operation and then what will happen? Will the UN take over that mission and will we be involved in that mission as we assist the region in trying to bring security.

And what about these guys? [Dallaire points to a slide with a list of middle power nations: Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, India, Australia, Brazil, Spain, Holland, Scandinavian, Mexico, South Africa, and Pakistan.] It is high time that this nation squeezes other countries, particularly the middle powers. One of the reasons the big nations are committing themselves so much is because the middle powers are not proportionally doing their jobs. The UN is stymied by the fact that the big powers, the permanent five are caught up in being the ones always having to respond and there is no other capabilities there that can handle the initial phases for which maybe we can bring solutions. The Germans, the Japanese, the Canadians, the Italians are not carrying their weight in any way, shape or form. And that is not right because that coalition could offer other options.

The Failure of Humanity to Prevent Genocide

We could have offered an option to the American-led coalition, as it fought its way through the Iraqi army, and said, “Don’t go into Baghdad. You’re carrying too much baggage. Your army is not a transparent and impartial body. The UN is still the only transparent and impartial body in the world. You just carry too much of the history. Let the middle powers, through the UN, go inside.” Maybe, just maybe we could have, with the U.S. in an overseeing capacity offered another option in those initial phases. And so ladies and gentlemen, the middle powers have not committed themselves and are playing on the coattails of the big powers. The strength and significance of this great nation is *not* in its use of power. It is in the *threat* of its use of power.

And so the United States must build instruments to get others involved. Others who are not committing themselves proportionally to the advancement of humanity and to the fundamental beliefs of human rights and to the credo that *all humans are humans and there isn’t one of us more human than the other.*



Photos by Andrea Hansen